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Abstract
This paper presents our implemented computa-
tional model for interpreting and generating in-
direct answers to Yes-No questions. Its main fea-
tures are 1) a discourse-plan-based approach to
implicature, 2) a reversible architecture for gen-
eration and interpretation, 3) a hybrid reasoning
model that employs both plan inference and log-
ical inference, and 4) use of stimulus conditions
to model a speaker's motivation for providing ap-
propriate, unrequested information. The model
handles a wider range of types of indirect answers
than previous computational models and has sev-
eral signicant advantages.
1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a discourse context for (1) in which R's
use of just (1d) is intended to convey a No, i.e.,
that R is not going shopping tonight. (By con-
vention, square brackets indicate that the enclosed
text was not explicitly stated.) The part of R's re-
sponse consisting of (1d) - (1e) is what we call an
indirect answer to a Yes-No question, and if (1c)
had been uttered, (1c) would have been called a
direct answer.
1.a. Q: I need a ride to the mall.
b. Are you going shopping tonight?
c. R: [no]
d. My car's not running.
e. The rear axle is broken.
According to one study of spoken English
[Stenstrom, 1984], 13 percent of responses to Yes-
No questions were indirect answers. Thus, the
ability to interpret indirect answers is required for
robust dialogue systems. Furthermore, there are
good reasons for generating indirect answers in-
stead of just yes, no, or I don't know. First, they
may provide information which is needed to avoid
misleading the questioner [Hirschberg, 1985]. Sec-
ond, they contribute to an ecient dialogue by
anticipating follow-up questions. Third, they may
be used for social reasons, as in (1).
This paper provides a computational model
for the interpretation and generation of indirect
answers to Yes-No questions in English. More pre-
cisely, by a Yes-No question we mean one or more
utterances used as a request by Q (the questioner)
that R (the responder) convey R's evaluation of
the truth of a proposition p. An indirect answer
implicitly conveys via one or more utterances R's
evaluation of the truth of the questioned proposi-
tion p, i.e. that p is true, that p is false, that there
is some truth to p, that p may be true, or that
p may be false. Our model presupposes that Q's
question has been understood by R as intended by
Q, that Q's request was appropriate, and that Q
and R are engaged in a cooperative goal-directed
dialogue. The interpretation and generation com-
ponents of the model have been implemented in
Common Lisp on a Sun SPARCstation.
The model employs an agent's pragmatic
knowledge of how language typically is used to
answer Yes-No questions in English to constrain
the process of generating and interpreting indirect
answers. This knowledge is encoded as a set of
domain-independent discourse plan operators and
a set of coherence rules, described in section 2.
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Figure 1 shows the architecture of our system. It
is reversible in that the same pragmatic knowl-
edge is used by the interpretation and generation
modules. The interpretation algorithm, described
in section 3, is a hybrid approach employing both
plan inference and logical inference to infer R's dis-
course plan. The generation algorithm, described
in section 4, constructs R's discourse plan in two
phases. During the rst phase, stimulus condi-
tions are used to trigger goals to include appro-
priate, extra information in the response plan. In
the second phase, the response plan is pruned to
eliminate parts which can be inferred by Q.
1
Our main sources of data were previous studies
[Hirschberg, 1985, Stenstrom, 1984], transcripts of
naturally occurring two-person dialogue [American
Express transcripts, 1992], and constructed examples.
INTERPRETATION GENERATION
discourse plan operators
discourse expectation
response
discourse expectation
THEOREM PROVER
          coherence rules
.
 Q’s beliefs  R’s beliefs 
Figure 1: Architecture of system
2. PRAGMATIC KNOWLEDGE
Linguists (e.g. see discussion in [Levinson, 1983])
have claimed that use of an utterance in a dia-
logue may create shared expectations about sub-
sequent utterances. In particular, a Yes-No ques-
tion creates the discourse expectation that R will
provide R's evaluation of the truth of the ques-
tioned proposition p. Furthermore, Q's assump-
tion that R's response is relevant triggers Q's at-
tempt to interpret R's response as providing the
requested information. We have observed that
coherence relations similar to the subject-matter
relations of Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST)
[Mann and Thompson, 1987] can be used in den-
ing constraints on the relevance of an indirect an-
swer. For example, the relation between the (im-
plicit) direct answer in (2b) and each of the indi-
rect answers in (2c) - (2e) is similar to RST's rela-
tions of Condition, Elaboration, and (Volitional)
Cause, respectively.
2.a. Q: Are you going shopping tonight?
b. R: [yes]
c. if I finish my homework
d. I'm going to Macy's
e. Winter clothes are on sale
Furthermore, for Q to interpret any of (2c) - (2e)
as conveying an armative answer, Q must be-
lieve that R intended Q to recognize the relational
proposition holding between the indirect answer
and (2b), e.g. that (2d) is an elaboration of (2b).
Also, coherence relations hold between parts of an
indirect answer consisting of multiple utterances.
For example, (1e) describes the cause of the fail-
ure reported in (1d). Finally, we have observed
that dierent relations are usually associated with
dierent types of answers. Thus, a speaker who
has inferred a plausible coherence relation holding
between an indirect answer and a possible (im-
plicit) direct answer may be able to infer the di-
rect answer. (If more than one coherence relation
( (Plausible (cr-obstacle
((not (in-state ?stateq ?tq))
(not (occur ?eventp ?tp)))))
<-
(state ?stateq)
(event ?eventp)
(timeperiod ?tq)
(timeperiod ?tp)
(before ?tq ?tp)
(app-cond ?stateq ?eventp)
(unless (in-state ?stateq ?tq))
(unless (occur ?eventp ?tp)))
Figure 2: A coherence rule for cr-obstacle
is plausible, or if the same coherence relation is
used with more than one type of answer, then the
indirect answer may be ambiguous.)
In our model we formally represent the co-
herence relations which constrain indirect answers
by means of coherence rules. Each rule consists
of a consequent of the form (Plausible (CR q
p)) and an antecedent which is a conjunction of
conditions, where CR is the name of a coherence
relation and q and p are formulae, symbols pre-
xed with \?" are variables, and all variables are
implicitly universally quantied. Each antecedent
condition represents a condition which is true i
it is believed by R to be mutually believed with
Q.
2
Each rule represents sucient conditions for
the plausibility of (CR q p) for some CR, q, p. An
example of one of the rules describing the Obsta-
2
Our model of R's beliefs (and similarly for Q's),
represented as a set of Horn clauses, includes 1) general
world knowledge presumably shared with Q, 2) knowl-
edge about the preceding discourse, and 3) R's beliefs
(including \weak beliefs") about Q's beliefs. Much of
the shared world knowledge needed to evaluate the co-
herence rules consists of knowledge from domain plan
operators.
(Answer-yes s h ?p): (Answer-no s h ?p):
Applicability conditions: Applicability conditions:
(discourse-expectation (discourse-expectation
(informif s h ?p)) (informif s h ?p))
(believe s ?p) (believe s (not ?p))
Nucleus: Nucleus:
(inform s h ?p) (inform s h (not ?p))
Satellites: Satellites:
(Use-condition s h ?p) (Use-otherwise s h (not ?p))
(Use-cause s h ?p) (Use-obstacle s h (not ?p))
(Use-elaboration s h ?p) (Use-contrast s h (not ?p))
Primary goals: Primary goals:
(BMB h s ?p) (BMB h s (not ?p))
Figure 3: Discourse plan operators for Yes and No answers
cle relation
3
is shown in Figure 2. The predicates
used in the rule are dened as follows: (in-state p
t) denotes that p holds during t, (occur p t) de-
notes that p happens during t, (state x) denotes
that the type of x is state, (event x) denotes that
the type of x is event, (timeperiod t) denotes that
t is a time interval, (before t1 t2) denotes that t1
begins before or at the same time as t2, (app-cond
q p) denotes that q is a plausible enabling con-
dition for doing p, and (unless p) denotes that p
is not provable from the beliefs of the reasoner.
For example, this rule describes the relation be-
tween (1d) and (1c), where (1d) is interpreted as
(not (in-state (running R-car) Present)) and (1c)
as (not (occur (go-shopping R) Future)). That is,
this relation would be plausible if Q and R share
the belief that a plausible enabling condition of a
subaction of a plan for R to go shopping at the
mall is that R's car be in running condition.
In her study of responses to questions, Sten-
strom [Stenstrom, 1984] found that direct an-
swers are often accompanied by extra, relevant
information,
4
and noted that often this extra in-
formation is similar in content to an indirect an-
swer. Thus, the above constraints on the relevance
of an indirect answer can serve also as constraints
on information accompanying a direct answer. For
maximum generality, therefore, we went beyond
our original goal of handling indirect answers to
the goal of handling what we call full answers. A
full answer consists of an implicit or explicit direct
answer (which we call the nucleus) and, possibly,
extra, relevant information (satellites).
5
In our
3
While Obstacle is not one of the original relations
of RST, it is similar to the causal relations of RST.
4
61 percent of direct No answers and 24 percent of
direct Yes answers
5
The terms nucleus and satellite have been bor-
rowed from RST to reect the informational con-
straints within a full answer. Note that according to
RST, a property of the nucleus is that its removal re-
model, we represent each type of full answer as a
(top-level) discourse plan operator. By represent-
ing answer types as plan operators, generation can
be modeled as plan construction, and interpreta-
tion as plan recognition.
Examples of (top-level) operators describing a
full Yes answer and a full No answer are shown
in Figure 3.
6
To explain our notation, s and
h are constants denoting speaker (R) and hearer
(Q), respectively. Symbols prexed with \?" de-
note propositional variables. The variables in the
header of each top-level operator will be instan-
tiated with the questioned proposition. In inter-
preting example (1), ?p would be instantiated with
the proposition that R is going shopping tonight.
Thus, instantiating the Answer-No operator in
Figure 3 with this proposition would produce a
plan for answering that R is not going shopping
tonight. Applicability conditions are necessary
conditions for appropriate use of a plan operator.
For example, it is inappropriate for R to give an
armative answer that p if R believes p is false.
Also, an answer to a Yes-No question is not ap-
propriate unless s and h share the discourse ex-
pectation that s will provide s's evaluation of the
truth of the questioned proposition p, which we
denote as (discourse-expectation (informif s h p)).
Primary goals describe the intended eects of the
plan operator. We use (BMB h s p) to denote
that h believes it mutually believed with s that p
[Clark and Marshall, 1981].
In general, the nucleus and satellites of a dis-
course plan operator describe primitive or non-
primitive communicative acts. Our formalism al-
sults in incoherence. However, in our model, a di-
rect answer may be removed without causing incoher-
ence, provided that it is inferable from the rest of the
response.
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The other top-level operators in our model,
Answer-hedged, Answer-maybe, and Answer-maybe-
not, represent the other answer types handled.
(Use-obstacle s h ?p):
;; s tells h of an obstacle explaining
;; the failure ?p
Existential variable: ?q
Applicability conditions:
(believe s (cr-obstacle ?q ?p))
(Plausible (cr-obstacle ?q ?p))
Stimulus conditions:
(explanation-indicated s h ?p ?q)
(excuse-indicated s h ?p ?q)
Nucleus:
(inform s h ?q)
Satellites:
(Use-elaboration s h ?q)
(Use-obstacle s h ?q)
(Use-cause s h ?q)
Primary goals:
(BMB h s (cr-obstacle ?q ?p))
Figure 4: Discourse plan operator for Obstacle
lows zero, one, or more occurrences of a satellite
in a full answer, and the expected (but not re-
quired) order of nucleus and satellites is the order
they are listed in the operator. (inform s h p) de-
notes the primitive act of s informing h that p.
The satellites in Figure 3 refer to non-primitive
acts, described by discourse plan operators which
we have dened (one for each coherence relation
used in a full answer). For example, Use-obstacle,
a satellite of Answer-no in Figure 3, is dened in
Figure 4.
To explain the additional notation in Figure 4,
(cr-obstacle q p) denotes that the coherence rela-
tion named obstacle holds between q and p. Thus,
the rst applicability condition can be glossed as
requiring that s believe that the coherence rela-
tion holds. In the second applicability condition,
(Plausible (cr-obstacle q p)) denotes that, given
what s believes to be mutually believed with h,
the coherence relation (cr-obstacle q p) is plausi-
ble. This sort of applicability condition is evalu-
ated using the coherence rules described above.
Stimulus conditions describe conditions moti-
vating a speaker to include a satellite during plan
construction. They can be thought of as trig-
gers which give rise to new speaker goals. In
order for a satellite to be selected during gen-
eration, all of its applicability conditions and at
least one of its stimulus conditions must hold.
While stimulus conditions may be derivative of
principles of cooperativity [Grice, 1975] or po-
liteness [Brown and Levinson, 1978], they provide
a level of precompiled knowledge which reduces
the amount of reasoning required for content-
planning. For example, Figure 5 depicts the dis-
course plan which would be constructed by R (and
Answer-no
/\
[1c] Use-obstacle
/\
1d Use-obstacle
|
1e
Figure 5: Discourse plan underlying (1d) - (1e)
must be inferred by Q) for (1). The rst stimu-
lus condition of Use-obstacle, which is dened as
holding whenever s suspects that h would be sur-
prised that p holds, describes R's reason for includ-
ing (1e). The second stimulus condition, which is
dened as holding whenever s suspects that the
Yes-No question is a prerequest [Levinson, 1983],
describes R's reason for including (1d).
7
3. INTERPRETATION
We assume that interpretation of dialogue is
controlled by a Discourse Model Processor
(DMP), which maintains a Discourse Model
[Carberry, 1990] representing what Q believes R
has inferred so far concerning Q's plans. The dis-
course expectation generated by a Yes-No question
leads the DMP to invoke the answer recognition
process to be described in this section. If answer
recognition is unsuccessful, the DMP would invoke
other types of recognizers for handling less pre-
ferred types of responses, such as I don't know or
a clarication subdialogue. To give an example of
where our recognition algorithm ts into the above
framework, consider (4).
4a. Q: Is Dr. Smith teaching CS1 next fall?
b. R: Do you mean Dr. Smithson?
c. Q: Yes.
d. R: [no]
e. He will be on sabbatical next fall.
f. Why do you ask?
Note that a request for clarication and its answer
are given in (4b) - (4c). Our recognition algorithm,
when invoked with (4e) - (4f) as input, would infer
an Answer-no plan accounting for (4e) and satis-
fying the discourse expectation generated by (4a).
When invoked by the DMP, our interpretation
module plays the role of the questioner Q. The
inputs to interpretation in our model consist of
7
Stimulus conditions are formally dened by rules
encoded in the same formalism as used for our co-
herence rules. A full description of the stimu-
lus conditions used in our model can be found in
[Green, in preparation].
1) the set of discourse plan operators and the set
of coherence rules described in section 2, 2) Q's
beliefs, 3) the discourse expectation (discourse-
expectation (informif s h p)), and 4) the semantic
representation of the sequence of utterances per-
formed by R during R's turn. The output is a
partially ordered set (possibly empty) of answer
discourse plans which it is plausible to ascribe to R
as underlying R's response. The set is ordered by
plausibility using preference criteria. Note that we
assume that the nal choice of a discourse plan to
ascribe to R is made by the DMP, since the DMP
must select an interpretation consistent with the
interpretation of any remaining parts of R's turn
not accounted for by the answer discourse plan,
e.g. (4f).
To give a high-level description of our answer
interpretation algorithm, rst, each (top-level) an-
swer discourse plan operator is instantiated with
the questioned proposition from the discourse ex-
pectation. For example (1), each answer operator
would be instantiated with the proposition that
R is going shopping tonight. Next, the answer
interpreter must verify that the applicability con-
ditions and primary goals which would be held by
R if R were pursuing the plan are consistent with
Q's beliefs about R's beliefs and goals. Consis-
tency checking is implemented using a Horn clause
theorem-prover. For all candidate answer plans
which have not been eliminated during consistency
checking, recognition continues by attempting to
match the utterances in R's turn to the actions
specied in the candidates. However, no candi-
date plan may be constructed which violates the
following structural constraint. Viewing a candi-
date plan's structure as a tree whose leaves are
primitive acts from which the plan was inferred,
no subtree T
i
may contain an act whose sequential
position in the response is included in the range
of sequential positions in the response of acts in a
subtree T
j
having the same parent node as T
i
. For
example, (5e) cannot be interpreted as related to
(5c) by cr-obstacle, due to the occurrence of (5d)
between (5c) and (5e). Note that a more coherent
response would consist of the sequence, (5c), (5e),
(5d).
5.a. Q: Are you going shopping tonight?
b. R: [no]
c. My car's not running.
d. Besides, I'm too tired.
e. The timing belt is broken.
To recognize a subplan for a non-primitive ac-
tion, e.g. Use-obstacle in Figure 4, a similar proce-
dure is used. Note that any applicability condition
of the form (Plausible (CR q p)) is dened to be
consistent with Q's beliefs if it is provable, i.e.,
if the antecedents of a coherence rule for CR are
true with respect to what Q believes to be mutu-
ally believed with R. The recognition process for
non-primitive actions diers in that these opera-
tors contain existential variables which must be
instantiated. In our model, the answer interpreter
rst attempts to instantiate an existential variable
with a proposition from R's response. For exam-
ple (1), the existential variable ?q of Use-obstacle
would be instantiated with the proposition that
R's car is not running. However, if (1d) was not
explicitly stated by R, i.e., if R's response had just
consisted of (1e), it would be necessary for ?q to
be instantiated with a hypothesized proposition,
corresponding to (1d), to understand how (1e) re-
lates to R's answer. The answer interpreter nds
the hypothesized proposition by a subprocedure
we refer to as hypothesis generation.
Hypothesis generation is constrained by the
assumption that R's response is coherent, i.e., that
(1e) may play the role of a satellite in a subplan of
some Answer plan. Thus, the coherence rules are
used as a source of knowledge for generating hy-
potheses. Hypothesis generation begins with ini-
tializing the root of a tree of hypotheses with a
proposition p
0
to be related to a plan, e.g. the
proposition conveyed by (1e). A tree of hypothe-
ses is constructed by expanding each of its nodes
in breadth-rst order until all goal nodes (as de-
ned below) have been reached, subject to a limit
on the depth of the breadth-rst search.
8
A node
containing a proposition p
i
is expanded by search-
ing for all propositions p
i+1
such that for some
coherence relation CR which may be used in the
type of answer being recognized, (Plausible (CR p
i
p
i+1
)) holds from Q's point of view. (The search is
implemented using a Horn clause theorem prover.)
The plan operator invoking hypothesis gener-
ation has a partially instantiated applicability con-
dition of the form, (Plausible (CR ?q p)), where
CR is a coherence relation, p is the proposition
that was used to instantiate the header variable of
the operator, and ?q is the operator's existential
variable. Since the purpose of the search is to nd
a proposition q with which to instantiate ?q, a goal
node is dened as a node containing a proposition
q satisfying the above condition. (E.g. in Figure 6
p
0
is the proposition conveyed by (1e), p
1
is the
proposition conveyed by (1d), p
0
and p
1
are plau-
sibly related by cr-obstacle, p
2
is the proposition
conveyed by a No answer to (1a), p
1
and p
2
are
plausibly related by cr-obstacle, p
2
is a goal node,
and therefore, p
1
will be used to instantiate the
existential variable ?q in Use-obstacle.)
After the existential variable is instantiated,
plan recognition proceeds as described above at
8
Placing a limit on the maximum depth of the tree
is reasonable, given human processing constraints.
p
0
p
1
p
2 goal (conveyed if 1c were uttered)
hypothesized (conveyed if 1d were uttered)
proposition from utterance (conveyed in 1e)
Figure 6: Hypothesis generation tree relating (1e)
to (1c)
the point where the remaining conditions are
checked for consistency.
9
For example, as recog-
nition of the Use-obstacle subplan proceeds, (1e)
would be recognized as the realization of a Use-
obstacle satellite of this Use-obstacle subplan. Ul-
timately, the inferred plan would be the same as
that shown in Figure 5, except that (1d) would be
marked as hypothesized.
The set of candidate plans inferred from a re-
sponse are ranked using two preference criteria.
10
First, as the number of hypothesized propositions
in a candidate increases, its plausibility decreases.
Second, as the number of non-hypothesized propo-
sitions accounted for by the plan increases, its
plausibility increases.
To summarize the interpretation algorithm, it
is primarily expectation-driven in the sense that
the answer interpreter attempts to interpret R's
response as an answer generated by some answer
discourse plan operator. Whenever the answer in-
terpreter is unable to relate an utterance to the
plan which it is currently attempting to recognize,
the answer interpreter attempts to nd a connec-
tion by hypothesis generation. Logical inference
plays a supplementary role, namely, in consistency
checking (including inferring the plausibility of co-
herence relations) and in hypothesis generation.
4. GENERATION
The inputs to generation consist of 1) the same
sets of discourse plan operators and coherence
rules used in interpretation, 2) R's beliefs, and 3)
the same discourse expectation. The output is a
9
Note that, in general, any nodes on the path be-
tween p
0
and p
h
, where p
h
is the hypothesis returned,
will be used as additional hypotheses (later) to connect
what was said to p
h
.
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Another possible criterion is whether the actual
ordering reects the default ordering specied in the
discourse plan operators. We plan to test the useful-
ness of this criterion.
discourse plan for an answer (indirect, if possible).
Generation of an indirect reply has two phases: 1)
content planning, in which the generator creates a
discourse plan for a full answer, and 2) plan prun-
ing, in which the generator determines which parts
of the planned full answer do not need to be ex-
plicitly stated. For example, given an appropriate
set of R's beliefs, our system generates a plan for
asserting only the proposition conveyed in (1e) as
an answer to (1b).
11
Content-planning is performed by top-down
expansion of an answer discourse plan operator.
Note that applicability conditions prevent inap-
propriate use of an operator, but they do not
model a speaker's motivation for providing extra
information. Further, a full answer might provide
too much information if every satellite whose oper-
ator's applicability conditions held were included
in a full answer. On the other hand, at the time R
is asked the question, R may not yet have the pri-
mary goals of a potential satellite. To overcome
these limitations, we have incorporated stimulus
conditions into the discourse plan operators in our
model. As mentioned in section 2, stimulus condi-
tions can be thought of as triggers or motivating
conditions which give rise to new speaker goals.
By analyzing the speaker's possible motivation for
providing extra information in the examples in our
corpus, we have identied a small set of stimu-
lus conditions which reect general concerns of
accuracy, eciency, and politeness. In order for
a satellite to be included in a full answer, all of
its applicability conditions and at least one of its
stimulus conditions must hold. (A theorem prover
is used to search for an instantiation of the exis-
tential variable satisfying the above conditions.)
The output of the content-planning phase, a
discourse plan representing a full answer, is the
input to the plan-pruning phase. The goal of this
phase is to make the response more concise, i.e. to
determine which of the planned acts can be omit-
ted while still allowing Q to infer the full plan. To
do this, the generator considers each of the acts
in the frontier of the full plan tree from right to
left (thus ensuring that a satellite is considered be-
fore its nucleus). The generator creates trial plans
consisting of the original plan minus the nodes
pruned so far and minus the current node. Then,
the generator simulates Q's interpretation of the
trial plan. If Q could infer the full plan (as the
most preferred plan), then the current node can
be pruned. Note that, even when it is not possi-
ble to prune the direct answer, a benet of this
approach is that it generates appropriate extra in-
formation with direct answers.
11
The tactical component must choose an appropri-
ate expression to refer to R's car's timing belt, de-
pending on whether (1d) is omitted.
5. RELATED RESEARCH
It has been noted [Diller, 1989, Hirschberg, 1985,
Lako, 1973] that indirect answers conversa-
tionally implicate [Grice, 1975] direct answers.
Recently, philosophers [Thomason, 1990, McCaf-
ferty, 1987] have argued for a plan-based ap-
proach to conversational implicature. Plan-based
computational models have been proposed for
similar discourse interpretation problems, e.g.
indirect speech acts [Perrault and Allen, 1980,
Hinkelman, 1989], but none of these models ad-
dress the interpretation of indirect answers. Also,
our use of coherence relations, both 1) as con-
straints on the relevance of indirect answers, and
2) in our hypothesis generation algorithm, is
unique in plan-based interpretation models.
In addition to RST, a number of theories of
text coherence have been proposed [Grimes, 1975,
Halliday, 1976, Hobbs, 1979, Polanyi, 1986,
Reichman, 1984]. Coherence relations have
been used in interpretation [Dahlgren, 1989,
Wu and Lytinen, 1990]. However, inference of co-
herence relations alone is insucient for inter-
preting indirect answers, since additional prag-
matic knowledge (what we represent as discourse
plan operators) and discourse expectations are
necessary also. Coherence relations have been
used in generation [McKeown, 1985, Hovy, 1988,
Moore and Paris, 1988, Horacek, 1992] but none
of these models generate indirect answers. Also,
our use of stimulus conditions is unique in gener-
ation models.
Most previous formal and computational
models of conversational implicature [Gazdar,
1979, Green, 1990, Hirschberg, 1985, Lascarides
and Asher, 1991] derive implicatures by classi-
cal or nonclassical logical inference with one or
more licensing rules dening a class of implica-
tures. Our coherence rules are similar conceptu-
ally to the licensing rules in Lascarides et al.'s
model of temporal implicature. (However, dif-
ferent coherence relations play a role in indirect
answers.) While Lascarides et al. model tem-
poral implicatures as defeasible inferences, such
an approach to indirect answers would fail to
distinguish what R intends to convey by his re-
sponse from other default inferences. We claim
that R's response in (1), for example, does not
warrant the attribution to R of the intention to
convey that the rear axle of R's car is made of
metal. Hirschberg's model for deriving scalar im-
plicatures addresses only a few of the types of
indirect answers that our model does. Further-
more, our discourse-plan-based approach avoids
problems faced by licensing-rule-based approaches
in handling backward cancellation and multiple-
utterance responses [Green and Carberry, 1992].
Also, a potential problem faced by those ap-
proaches is scalability, i.e., as licensing rules for
handling more types of implicature are added, rule
conicts may arise and tractability may decrease.
In contrast, our approach avoids such problems by
restricting the use of logical inference.
6. CONCLUSION
We have described our implemented computa-
tional model for interpreting and generating in-
direct answers to Yes-No questions. Its main fea-
tures are 1) a discourse-plan-based approach to
implicature, 2) a reversible architecture, 3) a hy-
brid reasoning model, and 4) use of stimulus condi-
tions for modeling a speaker's motivation for pro-
viding appropriate extra information. The model
handles a wider range of types of indirect answers
than previous computational models. Further-
more, since Yes-No questions and their answers
have features in commonwith other types of adja-
cency pairs [Levinson, 1983], we expect that this
approach can be extended to them as well. Fi-
nally, a discourse-plan-based approach to implica-
ture has signicant advantages over a licensing-
rule-based approach. In the future, we would
like to integrate our interpretation and generation
components with a dialogue system and investi-
gate other factors in generating indirect answers
(e.g. multiple goals, stylistic concerns).
References
[Allen, 1979] James F. Allen. A Plan-Based Ap-
proach to Speech Act Recognition. PhD the-
sis, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario,
Canada, 1979.
[American Express transcripts, 1992]
American Express tapes. Transcripts of audio-
tape conversations made at SRI International,
Menlo Park, California. Prepared by Jacqueline
Kowto under the direction of Patti Price.
[Brown and Levinson, 1978] Penelope Brown and
Stephen Levinson. Universals in language
usage: Politeness phenomena. In Es-
ther N. Goody, editor, Questions and politeness:
Strategies in social interaction, pages 56{289.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978.
[Carberry, 1990] Sandra Carberry. Plan Recogni-
tion in Natural Language Dialogue. MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990.
[Clark and Marshall, 1981] H. Clark and C. Mar-
shall. Denite reference and mutual knowl-
edge. In A. K. Joshi, B. Webber, and I. Sag,
editors, Elements of discourse understanding.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.
[Dahlgren, 1989] Kathleen Dahlgren. Coherence
relation assignment. In Proceedings of the An-
nual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society,
pages 588{596, 1989.
[Diller, 1989] Anne-Marie Diller. La pragmatique
des questions et des reponses. In Tubinger
Beitrage zur Linguistik 243. Gunter Narr Ver-
lag, Tubingen, 1989.
[Gazdar, 1979] G. Gazdar. Pragmatics: Implica-
ture, Presupposition, and Logical Form. Aca-
demic Press, New York, 1979.
[Green, 1990] Nancy L. Green. Normal state im-
plicature. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual
Meeting of the Association for Computational
Linguistics, pages 89{96, 1990.
[Green, in preparation] Nancy L. Green. A Com-
putational Model for Interpreting and Generat-
ing Indirect Answers. PhD thesis, University of
Delaware, in preparation.
[Green and Carberry, 1992] Nancy L. Green and
Sandra Carberry. Conversational implicatures
in indirect replies. In Proceedings of the 30th
Annual Meeting of the Association for Compu-
tational Linguistics, pages 64{71, 1992.
[Grice, 1975] H. Paul Grice. Logic and conver-
sation. In P. Cole and J. L. Morgan, editors,
Syntax and Semantics III: Speech Acts, pages
41{58, New York, 1975. Academic Press.
[Grimes, 1975] J. E. Grimes. The Thread of Dis-
course. Mouton, The Hague, 1975.
[Halliday, 1976] M. Halliday. Cohesion in English.
Longman, London, 1976.
[Hinkelman, 1989] Elizabeth Ann Hinkelman.
Linguistic and Pragmatic Constraints on Utter-
ance Interpretation. PhD thesis, University of
Rochester, 1989.
[Hirschberg, 1985] Julia Bell Hirschberg. A The-
ory of Scalar Implicature. PhD thesis, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, 1985.
[Hobbs, 1979] Jerry R. Hobbs. Coherence and
coreference. Cognitive Science, 3:67{90, 1979.
[Horacek, 1992] Helmut Horacek. An Integrated
View of Text Planning. In R. Dale, E. Hovy, D.
Rosner, and O. Stock, editors, Aspects of Auto-
mated Natural Language Generation, pages 29{
44, Berlin, 1992. Springer-Verlag.
[Hovy, 1988] Eduard H. Hovy. Planning coherent
multisentential text. In Proceedings of the 26th
Annual Meeting of the Association for Compu-
tational Linguistics, pages 163{169, 1988.
[Lako, 1973] Robin Lako. Questionable an-
swers and answerable questions. In Braj B.
Kachru, Robert B. Lees, Yakov Malkiel, An-
gelina Pietrangeli, and Sol Saporta, editors, Pa-
pers in Honor of Henry and Renee Kahane,
pages 453{467, Urbana, 1973. University of Illi-
nois Press.
[Lascarides and Asher, 1991] Alex Lascarides and
Nicholas Asher. Discourse relations and defea-
sible knowledge. In Proceedings of the 29th An-
nual Meeting of the Association for Computa-
tional Linguistics, pages 55{62, 1991.
[Levinson, 1983] S. Levinson. Pragmatics. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
[McCaerty, 1987] Andrew Schaub McCaerty.
Reasoning about Implicature: a Plan-Based Ap-
proach. PhD thesis, University of Pittsburgh,
1987.
[McKeown, 1985] Kathleen R. McKeown. Text
Generation. Cambridge University Press, 1985.
[Mann and Thompson, 1987] W. C. Mann and
S. A. Thompson. Rhetorical structure theory:
Toward a functional theory of text organization.
Text, 8(3):167{182, 1987.
[Moore and Paris, 1988] Johanna D. Moore and
Cecile L. Paris. Constructing coherent text us-
ing rhetorical relations. In Proceedings of the
10th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Sci-
ence Society, August 1988.
[Perrault and Allen, 1980] R. Per-
rault and J. Allen. A plan-based analysis of
indirect speech acts. American Journal of Com-
putational Linguistics, 6(3-4):167{182, 1980.
[Polanyi, 1986] Livia Polanyi. The linguistics dis-
course model: Towards a formal theory of dis-
course structure. Technical Report 6409, Bolt
Beranek and Newman Laboratories Inc., Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, 1987.
[Reichman, 1984] Rachel Reichman. Extended
person-machine interface. Articial Intelli-
gence, 22:157{218, 1984.
[Stenstrom, 1984] Anna-Brita Stenstrom. Ques-
tions and responses in english conversation. In
Claes Schaar and Jan Svartvik, editors, Lund
Studies in English 68. CWK Gleerup, Malmo,
Sweden, 1984.
[Thomason, 1990] Richmond H. Thomason. Ac-
commodation, meaning, and implicature: In-
terdisciplinary foundations for pragmatics. In
P. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. Pollack, edi-
tors, Intentions in Communication. MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1990.
[Wu and Lytinen, 1990] Horng Jyh Wu and
Steven Lytinen. Coherence relation reasoning
in persuasive discourse. In Proceedings of the
Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Soci-
ety, pages 503{510, 1990.
